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ABSTRACT
The increasing convergence of power-law networks such as social networking and peer-to-peer applications, web-delivered
applications, andmobile platformsmakes today’s users highly vulnerable to entirely new generations ofmalware that exploit
vulnerabilities in web applications and mobile platforms for new infections, while using the power-law connectivity for
ﬁnding new victims. The traditional epidemic models based on assumptions of homogeneity, average-degree distributions,
and perfect-mixing are inadequate to model this type of malware propagation. In this paper, we study four aspects crucial
to modeling malware propagation: application-level interactions among users of such networks, local network structure,
user mobility, and network coordination of malware such as botnets. Since closed-form solutions of malware propagation
considering these aspects are difﬁcult to obtain, we describe an open-source, ﬂexible agent-based emulation framework that
can be used by malware researchers for studying today’s complex malware. The framework, called Agent-Based Malware
Modeling (AMM), allows different applications, network structure, network coordination, and user mobility in either a
geographic or a logical domain to study various infection and propagation scenarios. In addition to traditional worms
and viruses, the framework also allows modeling network coordination of malware such as botnets. The majority of the
parameters used in the framework can be derived from real-life network traces collected from a network, and therefore,
represent realistic malware propagation and infection scenarios. As representative examples, we examine two well-known
malware spreading mechanisms: (i) a malicious virus such as Cabir spreading among the subscribers of a cellular network
using Bluetooth and (ii) a hybrid worm that exploit email and ﬁle-sharing to infect users of a social network. In both
cases, we identify the parameters most important to the spread of the epidemic based upon our extensive simulation results.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the landscape of malware attacks has
changed considerably from fast-spreading Internet worm
and virus incidents to more directed and precise attack tar-
geting. While the primary damage from past worms and
viruses such as Code Red [1], Nimda [2], and Slammer [3]
has been clogged networks and expensive clean-up opera-
tions, the new generation of malware is designed to steal
conﬁdential information, control remote systems for mali-
cious purposes, install backdoors, and shut down targeted
websites by launching coordinated denial of service attacks.
Examples include bot networks (botnets) [4,5], topological
worms [6--9] that spread via ﬁle-sharing, instant messaging
(IM), Internet RelayChat (IRC) and email networks, ‘drive-
by-downloads’ [10], and emerging mobile viruses [11,12]
capable of spreading via Bluetooth and SMS/MMS mes-
sages. The increasing convergence of social networks and
heterogenous computing devices has led to a new gener-
ation of malware that can exploit vulnerabilities of web
applications and mobile platforms to infect users while
using the power-law topology of these networks to prop-
agate very fast. While there have been many studies to
capture propagation dynamics of Internet-scale malware
such as Code Red or Nimda, very few studies have consid-
ered the heterogeneity and complexity of mobile and social
networking environments at a sufﬁcient detail when mod-
eling the emerging malware families. Due to the rapidly
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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growing popularity of power-law networks and heteroge-
neous computing devices, studying malware propagation is
an important area of research.
In particular, four key aspects of malware propagation
have not received adequate attention in existing models: (i)
most power-law networks are overlaid on a combination
of wireless LANs, wired segments and mobile networks,
with different bandwidth and latency distributions, (ii) inter-
actions among users can be diverse and (iii) mobility of
users can affect the rate at which an epidemic can either
grow or subside in the network, and (iv) malware such
as botnets use network coordination techniques to launch
coordinated attacks. In this paper, we develop realistic prop-
agation models at the time-scale and network structure of
mobile and power-law network environments, addressing
the above aspects. Most of the parameters in our epidemic
models can be derived explicitly from traces collected from
such networks, similar to what we collected from a large
enterprise network. Although our simulations show the epi-
demic spreading within a target enterprise environment, our
modeling approach is general.
This paper makes three primary contributions. First, we
demonstrate that the current epidemic models fail to cap-
ture applications, network connectivity structure, and user
mobility. Second, we present a general-purpose simulation
framework for understanding malware epidemics in such
integrated environments. Our framework, called Agent-
Based Malware Modeling (AMM), explicitly incorporates
non-homogeneous user interactions, user connectivities,
malware coordination (i.e. botnets), network bandwidth,
channel models of short-range radio devices, and user
mobility within a domain. An AMM model is built upon
autonomous agents that incorporate realistic models of
services and mobility. The agents can be arranged hierar-
chically in much the same way an enterprise network is
designed. For example, in our implementation of AMM,
‘base station agents’ can monitor and collect aggregated
statistics of activities of ‘mobile device agents’ in their
respective wireless local area networks (WLANs). In
case of botnets, network coordination can be achieved
by conﬁguring either a centralized command-and-control
(C&C) agent or via distributed agents in the model. Third,
AMM can be used by network designers and IT secu-
rity staff to investigate propagation dynamics and the
ﬁnal size of an epidemic for a variety of scenarios. This
will then help them to plan for proactive defense strate-
gies. Our goal is to publish AMM as an open-source
software for the malware research and network security
community.
The paper is organized as follows: We discuss the pri-
mary challenges in modeling malware in power-law and
mobile environments in Section 2. Section 3 describes
the AMM framework in detail, including infection mod-
els for applications commonly targeted by malware, and
user mobility models as implemented in the framework.
Section 4 discusses modeling botnets in AMM by setting
up a time-evolving C&C coordination network embedded
within the primary power-law network. In Section 5, we
simulate twowell-known attack scenarios to understand the
factors affecting the spreading rate of an epidemic. Section
6 brieﬂy reviews the existing literature on malware mod-
eling. We conclude in Section 7 with a discussion of our
future work.
2. MALWARE MODELING
CHALLENGES
There are four major challenges in accurate modeling of
an epidemic in power-law and mobile environments. To the
best of our knowledge, there does not exist any ﬁne-grained
model that addresses all of these challenges.
2.1. Application diversity
Thediversity of power-lawnetwork applications (e.g. email,
social networks, and P2P) and mobile platforms means that
even when a set of hosts are running similar services, not all
of them are equally vulnerable to the same exploits due to
different versions of client software. The epidemic mod-
els [1,3] developed for wide-area networks, such as the
Internet, do not consider such heterogeneity at the level of
individual users and hosts. However, diversity is important
when we consider propagation dynamics at microscopic
levels (i.e. considering individual users and hosts) where
the homogeneity assumption is no longer valid. A naive
application of the Kephart--White epidemic model [13] is
often not valid in this case. To incorporate heterogene-
ity in epidemic models, many previous studies (e.g., Ref.
[6]) have assumed a vulnerability ratio for the population.
However, it is not clear how one can come up with a vul-
nerability ratio for hybrid malware that exploit multiple
power-law networks as in the case of Nimda and Fizzer.
The epidemic modeling framework presented in this paper
explicitly captures message-level interactions among the
users, and captures the diversity of applications and the host
environment (OS, applications, transport protocols, etc.).
The service interactions from malicious agents are super-
imposed on the normal background trafﬁc calculated from
collected traces, and therefore, represent a more realistic
environment.
2.2. Local network structure
The shortcomings of the uniform-mixing assumption have
led to development of epidemic models that capture the
effects of contact patterns between individuals, instead
of the mean-ﬁeld theory. In uniform-mixing models, an
infected host has the same probability of infecting any vul-
nerable host in the population---this assumption is clearly not
valid for malware targeting power-law or mobile networks
that exploit the local network structure. Therefore, several
recent studies have investigated the effects of local network
connectivity on epidemic spreading. We refer to Ref. [14]
Security Comm. Networks 2013; 6:157 –
DOI: 10.1002/sec
15 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.6 98 1577
A.Bose andK.G. Shin Agent-based modeling of malware dynamics
and the references therein as the relevant literature, partic-
ularly for complex networks, small-world effects, models
of network growth, and power-law degree distribution. The
various models can be divided into two broad categories
based on whether the contact network structure is either
‘small-world’ [15] or ‘scale-free’ [16]. The scale-free nature
of technological networks and epidemic spreading in such
networks have also been studied, for example, in Refs. [17]
and [18], respectively. However, these studies derive only
the steady-state outcome of the epidemic in the limit of long
times, and do not provide the time evolution of the infection
process which is crucial in understanding how an epidemic
spreads in its initial stages andwhere to deploy containment
strategies. The propagation dynamics of malicious codes in
various models of scale-free networks have been studied
by a number of researchers [19,20]. In majority of these
studies, topologies are generated with power-law degree
distributions via either the Barabasi and Albert [15] or the
Klemm and Eguiluz [16] algorithm for a speciﬁed number
of nodes and a given power-law index. For example, Figure
1 plots a typical distribution of the computed ‘between-
ness centrality’ (BC) of P2P, email and overlapping (hosts
having email and P2P services) topologies from our traces
collected froma large class-B IPnetwork.TheBCat a vertex
k is computed as follows. Let Ck(i, j) denote the set of the
shortest pathways between a pair of vertices i and j through
the vertex k. The fraction gk(i, j) = (Ck(i, j))/(
∑
Ck(i, j))
indicates the importance of the vertex k between two ver-
tices i and j. The BC of vertex k is then deﬁned as gk =∑
i=j gk(i, j). Figure 1 conﬁrms the scale-free nature of
the service topologies in a real-life enterprise environment.
However, replacing an enterprise service topology with
a corresponding power-law network model still does not
account for the true propagation dynamics. Since almost
all malware exploit speciﬁc vulnerabilities in sequence of
messages and in speciﬁc OS stack or applications, the local
interactions constitute an important criteria for infection.
This is best captured when interaction topologies are con-
structed explicitly from traces collected from the target
network.
Figure 1. BC of email and P2P topologies.
2.3. Mobile users
Today’s mobile platforms introduce new propagation
vectors such as Bluetooth, SMS/MMS messaging, and
situational applications that malware writers increasingly
target. User mobility changes the interaction topology as
devices move around the physical environment of the enter-
prise. The problems with the Kephart--White infection
model for malware that spread via short-range RF such as
Bluetooth have been identiﬁed in a recent study [21]. The
standard epidemic models fail because they ignore node
velocity and the non-homogeneous connectivity distribu-
tions among the nodes. In addition, the location-speciﬁc
density distribution of mobile devices can potentially affect
the spread of an epidemic. The spread of an epidemic has
not been studied in environments that consist of overlapping
mobile wireless and wired segments with users switching
to different network resources in different locations of an
enterprise. Our framework addresses this by incorporating
user mobility models as part of each agent in the domain.
2.4. Network coordination among infected
hosts
Network coordination among the infected hosts is a spe-
cial consideration for modeling botnets. While traditional
worms and viruses can be modeled as independent infec-
tions, botnets use a number of mechanisms to achieve
coordination among the infected hosts. We enable network
coordination among the connected nodes of a malware net-
work via an embedding of a secondary network structure in
AMM. Since botnets have modeling requirements that are
different from traditional malware, we describe incorpora-
tion of botnets inAMM in a separate section (see Section 4).
3. AGENT-BASED MALWARE
MODELING
3.1. Motivation
Deterministic methods [1,3] developed for modeling the
previous generations of worms, such as Code Red, Sap-
phire, and variants thereof, are well-suited to characterize
the spread of an epidemic in large populations such as
the Internet. However, they are not accurate for modeling
small populations such as a social network. As we already
argued, these models unrealistically assume perfect-mixing
and homogeneity within the population.Malware that prop-
agates by exploiting local node connectivity can hardly be
modeled by the homogeneity assumption. The homogeneity
assumption fails to hold on both host attributes (i.e., diver-
sity of OSs, services, and mobility) as well as the network
structure among the hosts. The homogeneity assumption
also does not hold when interactions are highly correlated
with network structure. Topologicalworms [6,20] spread by
targeting speciﬁc services such as IM, P2P, and email---the
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topology of these service-interaction networks† may lead
to signiﬁcant deviations from the results of the differential
equation-based models. Similarly, in case of mobile nodes,
the connectivity patterns change depending on how users
roam around the network as well as their speed and pause
times.
An agent-based modeling approach can relax the
homogeneity and perfect-mixing assumptions by (i) incor-
porating heterogeneity in agent attributes, (ii) modeling the
state transitions of an agent as an explicit stochastic process,
and (iii) allowing highly structured topologies of service
interactions among the agents. The interaction topologies
can be generated from traces collected from a network, and
input to the agent-based model.
Note that AMM provides a more realistic description of
the world. It can easily incorporate changes in individual
user mobility patterns and messaging patterns among the
agents (i.e., service interactions). This makes the model
closer to reality than averaged equation-based methods. As
discussed in Ref. [22], agent-based modeling makes it pos-
sible to realize the full potential of the data one may have
to describe the dynamics of a physical phenomenon. The
complexity of differential equation-based approaches will
have to increase exponentially to account for hosts running
multiple services or for mobile agents. On the other hand,
AMM models activities at the agent level, and sources of
randomness are applied to these activities and the underly-
ing service queues, as opposed to arbitrarily adding noise
terms to an aggregate epidemic model.
While AMM can readily incorporate agent diversity and
interaction topologies, the computations required to per-
form a full sensitivity analysis can be expensive due to
the large number of parameters in a typical agent-based
model. Clearly, such an approach is not feasible for model-
ing malware propagation over the entire Internet. However,
our studies show that network-level modeling with AMM
is feasible and offers a much richer simulation approach to
mobile malware modeling. Due to the stochastic nature of
AMM, it is possible that in some cases, either no epidemic
is observed or the epidemic ends early even when the basic
reproduction number indicates otherwise. We investigate
this further in our evaluation (Section 5), and show that the
local network structure greatly inﬂuences the probability of
an infection spreading through an enterprise.
3.2. The AMM framework
We now describe the AMM prototype developed for study-
ing malware propagation. We model a given domain (either
geographic or logical) as a collection of networked and
autonomous decision-making entities called agents. The
agents represent networked devices within an enterprise,
such as desktops, servers, laptops, access points, PDAs,
† The term “contact networks” is also used in the epidemiology litera-
ture.
and cell phones, and their users. The connectivity among the
agents depends on the interaction topology. In case of agents
representing mobile devices, the connectivity changes as
users roam about the physical space of the domain. The
behaviors of the agents are speciﬁed by a set of services
(or, applications) running on them. For example, an agent
may consist of client programs for email and IM, whereas
another agent may consist of an email (SMTP) server only.
Thus, there are two types of topologies in our simula-
tion environment. The physical connectivity is determined
by the physical network infrastructure, movement of the
agents, location of access points and base stations, whereas
the logical connectivity is determined by the messages
exchanged among the agents. An agent may participate
in multiple logical topologies corresponding to different
services like email, IM, P2P, social network, etc. We also
group the agents in a hierarchical manner. For example,
agents representing wireless access points can keep track
of mobile devices in their respectiveWLANs. Accordingly,
access point agents are able to collect information aggre-
gated over the individual devices in their WLANs. This
capability of higher-level agents to aggregate observations
collected from lower-level agents reﬂects real-life process-
ing of information in such environments. We note that the
information processed at these different levels can also be
used to activate different response mechanisms against a
spreading malware.
Figure 2 shows a ﬂowchart of our prototype simulator.
The ﬁrst step is to prepare the following input parameters
for AMM: (i) infection-model parameters for the target
services, (ii) topology of service interactions among the
hosts, (iii) location of access points and base stations,
(iv) mobility models for hosts that are mobile, (v) attack
vector of malware, (vi) detection model of malware, and
(vii) an attack response model (containment, rate-limiting,
anti-virus, etc.), if any. At the beginning of a simulation
run, agents are instantiated with appropriate attributes (i.e.
agent-level objects). At each timestep, the coordinates of
mobile agents are updated based on their mobility patterns,
resulting in new connectivity graphs. Each agent exchanges
messages with other agents according to the service model-
--the probability of any of these messages being infected
is calculated from the service-infection model. The time
steps are repeated over a user-speciﬁed number of trials
so that the results can be averaged over these trials. The
simulator is general enough to experiment with different
algorithms for malware detection and containment. The
detection algorithm can be implemented at various levels
of hierarchy, e.g., at individual devices, access points, or
networks segments, depending on the granularity of the
detection algorithm. If a domain has an established set of
containment policies, whenever an infection is detected,
containment steps can be activated at various levels of the
logical and physical network topologies.
The infection-model parameters and service topologies
can be extracted from traces collected from the service
provider’s network. The infection-model of a service con-
sists of parameters that affect the propagation of a malware
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Figure 2. Flowchart of AMM prototype.
targeting that speciﬁc service. We describe infection-model
parameters for email, P2P, IM, and Bluetooth in Section
5. The model parameters are ideally ﬁtted to data from a
set of network traces collected from the target enterprise
environment as shown in Figure 2. However, data from the
existing literature are often sufﬁcient for incorporating an
infection model exploiting a given service. Examples of
possible services that may be targeted by emerging mal-
ware are SMS/MMS, web services, VoIP, etc. Reliable
infection models for these services are not yet available.
However, using our simulator, various possible infection
models can be studied---this is where the trace-driven AMM
can be very attractive and promising. The inclusion of a
service-infection model results in a more realistic epidemic
spreading in AMM. An alternative is to simply input the
topology of a particular service like email, and consider all
nodes in the graph equally vulnerable to an email worm.
The spread of the epidemic in this case solely depends
on a constant infection probability and the topology of the
email network. While most modeling literature on malware
spreading that exploits services follows this methodology,
this simulates only the worst-case attack scenario and may
not represent the true spreading of the epidemic within an
enterprise.
3.2.1. Agent attributes.
Figure 3 shows an UML representation of our AMMpro-
totype. The framework has three major classes of agents:
domain agents maintain a list of all global parameters, per-
form averaging over multiple trials and contain a number of
network segment agents. The network segment agents can
be of three types:wired, cellular, andwireless (e.g., 802.11b
WLANs). Each segment agent contains a number of device
agents (i.e., hosts and users). In case of wireless and cel-
lular segments, the device agents are built with embedded
mobility models (described later), whereas for a wired net-
work segment, the device agents are stationary. Note that
the segments can be overlapping, i.e., a wireless segment
can be built on top of a wired segment with access points
being the communication links between the two segments.
As mentioned earlier, we also explicitly construct agents to
model access points, base stations and service gateways for
popular services such as SMSor IM.This allows us to inves-
tigate not only malware propagation but also containment
and mitigation strategies.
3.2.1.1. Agent mobility Mobile and wireless
devices are a rapidly increasing constituent of any enter-
prise environment. To simulate such an environment,
AMM employs mobile agents. There are a variety of
mobility models available to simulate different cellular and
ad hoc wireless environments. We refer to Refs. [23,24] for
a discussion of these models. We have implemented two
commonly used models proposed for ad hoc wireless and
cellular environments, namely, Random Waypoint (RWP)
and Gauss-Markov (GM) mobility models, respectively.
In the RWP model, a node randomly chooses a destina-
tion in the simulation area and moves at a speed v chosen
randomly from the uniform distribution [vmin, vmax] along a
straight path towards the destination. Then, the node pauses
for a constant time tpause before it chooses a new destina-
tion randomly. A node in the RWP model is, therefore,
characterized by its current coordinates, current speed, cur-
rent destination point, and pause time. Following Ref. [25],
we avoid the initial high variability in average neighbor
numbers by discarding the results of the initial 1000 s of
simulation time and then saving the mobile positions as the
initial starting locations of our simulation.
The GMmobility model uses aMarkov process in updat-
ing both speed and direction of a mobile node. Originally
proposed for simulation of PCS networks [26], GM allows
adaptation to different levels of randomness via a tunable
parameter. In GM, each node updates its speed (st) and
direction (dt) at time t based on their values at time t−1 as:
st = αst−1 + (1−α)s¯ +
√
(1−α2)sxt−1 (1)
dt = αdt−1 + (1−α) ¯d +
√
(1−α2)dxt−1 (2)
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Figure 3. Agent attributes and functions.
where 0≤α≤ 1 is the tuning parameter, s¯ and ¯d are the
mean value of speed and direction as n → ∞, respectively.
sxt−1 and dxt−1 are random variables drawn from a Gaussian
distribution.
3.2.2. Service-infection models.
In AMM, a device agent can be set up to run a set
of services. Following the worm taxonomy model of
Ellis [27], we denote the service availability as a map-
ping of services to ports and write it as a set of tuples
{(s1, port1), (s1, port1), · · · , (sn, portn)}. Some of these ser-
vices constitute the set of exploits for a spreading malware.
Figure 4 shows the state machine of a generic service
running on an agent. The set of states of a service
are {Immune, Vulnerable, Infected, {Quarantined, Throt-
tled}}. {Quarantined, Throttled} represents ﬁne-grained
states denoting the defensive action takenwhen an infection
is detected. This allows one to simulate different defen-
sive measures and compare their effectiveness. For known
attacks, an anti-virus patch can also be applied to a ser-
vice, thereby transitioning the state of the service from
Infected to Immune. In a contained network, a device can
Service
Vulnerable
Process
Messages
Infection
Model
Send
Queue
Receive
Queue
Quarantine
(Proactive)
Infected
Quarantine
Immune
Antivirus
Quarantined Throttled
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Figure 4. Model of an infection targeting a service.
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attain any of the three ﬁnal states {Quarantined, Throttled,
Immune}.
A device agent sends and receives messages from other
agents corresponding to each service tuple (s, port). The
service class data structure achieves this via separate send
and receive message queues for each service. Each service
also has an infectionmodel of a malware exploiting the spe-
ciﬁc vulnerability. The state transition from Vulnerable to
Infected is determinedby this infectionmodel. The infection
model is service-speciﬁc and consists of a set of parameters
with their values given either as data ranges or probability
density functions. Figure 5 lists the service-infection model
parameters for SMS,Bluetooth, IM, P2P, andEmail, thatwe
have implemented in AMM. The sources of these param-
eters are traces collected from an enterprise (T), empirical
models of user behaviors (M) and calibration experiments
(E). When the state of any service is Infected, the outgoing
messages from an agent are tagged as Infected based on run-
time values of these parameters. Similarly, when an infected
message is received from another host or user in the net-
work, the infection model determines whether the service
state should be changed from Vulnerable to Infected. Next,
we detail service-infection models for SMS, Bluetooth, IM,
P2P, and Email.
3.2.2.1. SMS model A recent study [28] presented
SMSuser behavior based on call data records andSS7 traces
collected over a 3-week period from a large cellular carrier
with 10 million mobile users. The data allowed us to con-
struct a realistic SMSmessaging networkwith the following
parameters: message sending rates (ns(Ncs)), message
receiving rates (nr(Ncs)), cumulative density functions (cdf)
of user-to-user message size (B) and message service time
(Tssms), and the SMSuser topology (G(Ncs, Ecs)), whereNcs
and Ecs represent the total number of cellular subscribers in
the network and the number of service-interaction edges,
respectively. We also introduce two parameters describing
the spread of the malicious agent: malicious agent messag-
ing rate (ms(Ics)) for the set of infected mobile users (Ics)
and a probability of reading an infected message (Pr sms). In
the absence of traces collected during an actual occurrence
of a mobile worm or virus, one has to estimate these two
parameters.
3.2.2.2. Bluetooth RF model The connectivity of
an ad hoc wireless network such as those formed by Blue-
tooth and other short-range RF devices strongly inﬂuences
the effectiveness of malware spreading via proximity scan-
ning. To determine if two Bluetooth-enabled devices are
neighbors, one can simply use a threshold distance (r0). For
example, in case of class-2 Bluetooth devices, r0 = 10m.
However, one should consider a more realistic wireless
channel model by considering shadowing effects that are
induced by the presence of obstacles. This means that
the connectivity between two devices is now a stochastic
parameter. Following Bettstetter and Hartmann [23], we
adopt a log-normal shadow-fading model to determine if
an infected device can send a message to a nearby device
using an existing vulnerability in the Bluetooth stack. In a
shadow-fading environment, the signal attenuation, β(u, v)
between a pair of nodes u and v is expressed as the sum
of (i) a deterministic geometric component β1 based on the
relative distance r(u, v) and (ii) a stochastic component β2
where
β1(u, v) = α 10log10
(
r(u, v)
1m
)
dB (3)
and β2 is chosen from a log-normal probability density
function:
fβ2 (β2) =
1√
2πσ
exp
(
− β
2
2
2σ2
)
(4)
where α is the path-loss component (2≤α≤ 5) and σ is
the standard deviation (|σ| ≤ 10 dB). For a given transmit
power pt and a threshold receive power pr,th, two devices u
and v are neighbors if the attenuationbetween themsatisﬁes:
β(u, v) ≤ βth where the threshold attenuation βth is given
by:
βth = 10log10
(
pt
pr,th
)
dB (5)
Equations (3) and (5) alongwith themobilitymodels give
us a propagationmodel of amalware that exploits Bluetooth
vulnerability and spreads to different areas of an enterprise
as the users move about the physical space. In Section 5,
we study Cabir-like malware that exploit vulnerabilities in
the Bluetooth stack to propagate.
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3.2.2.3. IM model We refer to Ref. [7] for a dis-
cussion of IM worms, client vulnerabilities, and proposed
defensive measures. Our model for IM worm propagation
consists of: message sending rate (ns(N)), ﬁle transfer rate
(nf (N)), message service time (T ims ), malicious agent mes-
saging rate (ms(Ics)) and message (i.e., attachment or link)
opening probability (P imr ), where N and Ics represent the
total number of IM users and the set of infected IM users,
respectively. Of these, ns(N), nf (N), and T ims can be derived
from IM server logs within an enterprise.
3.2.2.4. P2P model The authors of Ref. [6] present
an epidemic simulator that takes as input Gnutella topol-
ogy graphs and the probability of a node being a guardian
node. They denote a guardian node as a member of the P2P
network that can detect a worm and forward alerts to its
neighbors. Although they consider the effect of node diver-
sity by having a fraction of the nodes as initially immune
to the attack, they did not consider the peer-level diversity.
The propagation of a ﬁle-sharing worm is inﬂuenced by
such factors as peer uptime (T upi ), peer query activity (Qi),
and session duration (Si). If peers tend to be unavailable fre-
quently, a ﬁle-sharing worm will not spread quickly. This is
because the degree of replication necessary to ensure that
the ﬁle content is consistently accessible is low for peers
with small up-times. Similarly, peer activity levels and how
peers issue and respond to queries, inﬂuence the proba-
bility of an infected ﬁle to be downloaded. We adopt the
distribution functions for peer up-time, query activity, and
session duration described in Refs. [29,30] based on exper-
imental observations of common P2P networks. Similar to
mass-mailing worms, a downloaded ﬁle must be opened
by the user for the ﬁle-sharing worm code to be activated.
Therefore, we add a ﬁle opening probability (P fi ) for each
peer.
3.2.2.5. Email model We adopt the model devel-
oped by Zou et al. [8] based on human behaviors affecting
email worms. Their model is based on two key parame-
ters: an email checking time interval (Ti) which is the time
interval between checking two consecutive emails at host
i, and an opening probability (Pmi ) which is the probability
of a user on host i opening an email with a worm-infected
payload or attachment. As in Ref. [8], we assume that the
mean of Ti and Pi are generated from Gaussian-distributed
random variables T (∼ N(µT , σ2T )) and P(∼ N(µP, σ2P )),
respectively. The parameters used for T and P are: µT = 40,
σT= 20, µP = 0.5, and σP = 0.3.
Although there have been recent studies on the mod-
eling of malware propagation using IM, P2P, and Email,
our work has important differences from these studies. The
usage of real-life traces to construct the service-infection
models creates realistic power-law network environments.
In our framework, services can be composed for any given
agent in the domain, and therefore, hybrid worms using IM
and P2P (e.g., Bropia) can be easily simulated. These sim-
ulations generate realistic trafﬁc corresponding to IM and
P2P messages in topologies that are constructed directly
from the traces. As an example of hybrid worms, we will
later study a worm that propagates via both email and P2P
networks.
4. AGENT COORDINATION IN AMM
4.1. Motivation
In order to model botnets, we have designed AMM with
the capability of coordinated agents. This is required for
modeling botnets that are behaviorally different from the
type of worms and viruses such as Code Red or Bropia.
Botnets [5,31] are networks of semi-autonomous software
agents or ‘bots’ that are deployed using either centralized
or distributed C&C infrastructure. In recent years, they
have become synonymous with malicious activities on the
Internet, e.g., bots have been deployed to launch denial-
of-service attacks, install spyware on compromised hosts,
serve adware, and email spams. Botnets are different from
self-propagating worms and other malware in several ways.
For example, nodes in a botnet can be commanded to per-
form a set of coordinated tasks by the owner of the botnet
(also known as the ‘botmaster’). This makes them far more
malicious than traditional malware. Further, bots routinely
use traditional malware as their infection and propagation
mechanism.
Botnets also utilize increasingly sophisticated evasion
techniques, e.g., fast-ﬂux DNS, tunneling over other trafﬁc
(VoIP, HTTP, IPv6) [32], and encrypted trafﬁc [33]. These
techniques make it very difﬁcult to detect and shut down a
botnet evenwhen some of its nodes are exposed. Traditional
botnets have had a centralized C&C structure based on the
IRC protocol. This type of infrastructure can be brought
down easily by ﬁnding and eliminating the central node.
In contrast, the fast-ﬂux DNS technique [34] used by more
recent botnets allows a botnet to hide its malware delivery
sites behind a continuously changing network of compro-
mised hosts that act as proxies. This is accomplished by
individual nodes within the network re-registering their IP
addresses periodically as part of the DNS A record list for
a single DNS name. This can also mask the botmaster’s
system which exploits the network via a series of prox-
ies, thereby making detection very difﬁcult. While C&C is
centralized in IRL botnets, P2P botnets such as Storm have
developed a decentralizedC&Cmodel. In P2P botnets, each
compromised host maintains a list of peers in the network.
Upon receipt of a message from the botmaster, a node for-
wards the message to its peers. As a result, when some of
the nodes of a botnet are discovered, the rest of the botnet
can still function. P2P botnets have grown tremendously
in recent years with the introduction of DHT-based (dis-
tributed hash table) peer-to-peer protocols such as Chord
and Overnet (using the Kademlia DHT algorithm [35]).
While we have not yet implemented botnet evasion
techniques, AMM currently supports both centralized and
distributed C&C, via an embedding mechanism called
‘agent coordination network,’ presented later in this section.
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4.2. Botnet service-infection model
Botnets are modeled in AMM by extending the service-
infection model of a traditional worm. This is due to
the fact that the infection phase of a bot such as Pea-
comm/Storm [36] is very similar to that of a traditional
worm. It is only after infection that the bot downloads
the secondary injections from a remote host to establish
the communication primitive for the botnet, and joins the
botnet. From this point on, the botmaster is able to com-
mand the newly infected bot, install additional malicious
binaries, and to modify C&C addresses. Figure 6 shows
the states of a P2P bot such as Storm as implemented
in AMM.
Most P2P botnets such as Storm propagate via email
spam, by directing the recipient to download an executable
from a website. When this executable runs, it can take
advantage of known client-side vulnerabilities to install
a rootkit. This initial phase creates the initialization ﬁle
spooldir.ini that will later contain the list of peers. At this
point, the host (an AMM agent) can be considered infected
but not yet part of the botnet. Storm uses an encrypted ver-
sion of the UDP-based Overnet protocol to ﬁnd other nodes
in the P2P network. The malware tries to initiate the peer-
lookup algorithm every 10min if no hosts in the initial list
of peers are responsive [36]. When a peer responds, the bot
may undertake one of several activities: (i) update the list
of peers in spooldir.ini, (ii) download details of a new spam
campaign, (iii) download updates of existing executables,
and (iv) initiate spam campaigns or denial of service activ-
ities. Note that the Overnet/Kademlia protocol is primarily
used as a directory service to ﬁnd other nodes by Storm. For
managing C&C activities such as which one of the above
actions the bot will perform, Storm uses a custom TCP-
based protocol. This is implemented in AMM as an overlay
network as described below.
4.3. Agent coordination network
TheC&Cprotocol is implemented inAMMas an additional
service running on an infected agent. However, unlike tra-
ditional malware, this service is not started on an agent
automatically at the start of the simulation. Only after an
infected agent has successfully found a peer and joined the
botnet, the service is activated. As a result, a secondary net-
work, which we call the ‘agent coordination network,’ is
overlaid on top of the Overnet-based P2P network (in case
of Storm). This overlay network changes its structure over
time as bots join and exit the C&C service. As shown in
Figure 6, all AMM messages are placed in either the ‘send’
or ‘receive’ queues of an agent. Depending on whether a
message is intended for the Overnet directory service or for
theC&C service, themessage is delivered to the appropriate
service running on agents.
5. SIMULATION OF ATTACK
SCENARIOS
In this section, we investigate two likely attack scenarios
using the AMM framework. First, we study the potential
Figure 6. AMM service-infection model for storm malware.
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spread of a Bluetooth-based virus such as Cabir in a multi-
cell mobile network. Next, we investigate the spreading rate
of a hybrid topological worm that can spread via both Email
and P2P ﬁle-sharing networks.
5.1. Proximity scanning via Bluetooth
This attack scenario considers subscribers of a mobile data
and voice provider. We assume that a fraction of the sub-
scribers have unprotected Class-2 Bluetooth-enabled cell
phones, PDAs, and other mobile devices. The range of a
Class-2 Bluetooth device is typically 10m. The coverage
area of the subscribers is serviced by 10 base stations. We
consider two different channelmodels: (i) a threshold radius
of 10m and (ii) shadow fading described in Section 3. In the
latter case, the connectivity of themobile nodes is dependent
on the terrain conditions. We then simulate the spread of a
Cabir-like virus [11], a much-publicized mobile virus that
infects unprotected Bluetooth-enabled devices. The mobil-
ity of users is modeled using RWP and we consider both
‘slow’- and ‘fast’-moving users to study the effect of node
velocity on the spread of the virus. The various parameters
for the simulation, such as velocities for slow (vslow) and fast
(vfast) movement, are presented in Table I. The notations are
explained in Figure 5.
We denote E(I(t)) as the expected number of infected
nodes at time t, averaged over 100 trial runs of the simula-
tor. We have used a time step of 200ms, and all simulations
were continued for 1000 time steps unless all nodes in the
network were already infected. We consider two cases of
initial infection, I(0)= 1 and 4. Since Cabir affects only
devices running the Symbian OS, we have included the
vulnerability ratio (v) to denote a fraction of the nodes with
this particular OS. Figure 7 shows the effect of node veloc-
ity on the spread of the epidemic. At very high velocities,
the connectivity of the nodes change very quickly, allowing
for a high mixing between infected and vulnerable nodes.
This accounts for the large difference inE(I(t)) between the
slow- and fast-moving experiments, especially at a low vul-
nerability ratio (v= 0.1). It is interesting to note that when
most of the nodes in the network are vulnerable (v= 0.9),
the spread of the virus is no longer dependent on the node
velocity because the majority of the interactions with an
infected node result in new infections.
Table I. Parameters for proximity-based propagation.
Parameter Value
˛ 3
 4dB
ˇth 30 dB
r0 10m
vslow (RWP) [2, 24]m/s
vfast (RWP) [350, 400]m/s
tpause 0
v [0, 0.1, 0.9]
I(0) [1, 4]
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Figure 7. Effect of node velocity on Cabir propagation.
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Figure 8. Effect of channel models on Cabir propagation
(v= vulnerability ratio).
Figure 8 shows the impact of choosing a particular Blue-
tooth channel model on the growth of the epidemic. The
shadow-fading model results in higher connectivity among
the nodes, thereby increasing the probability of contact with
an infected node.This is in contrastwith infection basedon a
threshold radius of 10m. The epidemic growth curves based
on the threshold radiusmodel for v= 0.1 and v= 0.9 are vir-
tually identical. The data in Figure 8 illustrates the need for
accurate modeling of the radio interface in mobile virus
spreading. To account for devices running other mobile
OSs, we present the results for different values of v and I(0)
in Figure 9. The results are intuitive since a higher value of
either v or I(0) will result in a higher growth rate of the virus.
To understand the effect of pause times, we simulated the
virus spreading with v= 0.9, slow-moving users and pause
times of 0, 100 and 1000ms. Figure 10 indicates that as
pause time increases, the mixing among the infected and
vulnerable nodes decreases, resulting in a slower spread of
the epidemic.
In a recent study [21], the authors studied the spread of
a Bluetooth virus in a mobile ad hoc network based on the
threshold radius approach. Although they did not consider
Security Comm. Networks 2013; 6:157 –
DOI: 10.1002/sec
15 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.6 98 1585
A.Bose andK.G. Shin Agent-based modeling of malware dynamics
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
 1600
 1800
 2000
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
A
ve
ra
ge
 in
fe
ct
io
ns
, E
(I(
t))
Time step, t
I(0)=1,v=0.1
I(0)=4,v=0.1
I(0)=1,v=0.9
I(0)=4,v=0.9
Figure 9. Effect of vulnerability ratio (v) on Cabir propagation.
the effect of channel fading, we simulated one of the exam-
ples presented in Ref. [21] to compare the results. There
is an important difference in the two sets of simulations.
The infection model in Ref. [21] consists of a removal rate
δ where as our study assumes that a mobile node, once
infected, stays infected for the rest of the simulation, i.e.
we consider a completely unprotected network. However,
we can still compare the average connectivity among the
nodes between the two approaches since this is an important
parameter not considered by the traditional deterministic SI
(Susceptible-Infected) andKephart--Whitemodels. Follow-
ing Ref. [21], we ran a simulation with 60 mobile nodes in
an area of 1000× 1000m2 and a speed range of [5,20]m/s.
We also assumed that the nodes are equipped with a class
1 Bluetooth device (r0 = 100m). After 3000 time steps,
we calculated the average connectivity of the nodes to be
2.09 as compared to a value of 2.37 in case of Ref. [21].
We also found the initial growth rates of the two simula-
tions very similar. There is a persistent infection in case
of Ref. [21] but the classical KW model overpredicts its
magnitude.
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Figure 10. Effect of pause time on Cabir propagation.
Table II. Trace properties.
Parameter Value
Size (bytes) 5 756 476 279
Duration (s) 3600
# Packets 120 067 838
# IP addresses 11 647
# Vertices (email) 2126
# Edges (email) 2550
# Vertices (P2P) 7150
# Edges (P2P) 7287
5.2. Topological spreading via email and
P2P file-sharing
Next, we study the propagation of a hybrid worm that can
spread via multiple vectors, in particular email and P2P
ﬁle-sharing networks. Speciﬁc examples of this class of
worms are Bagle.AH and Netsky.C. From the collected
traces of the Class-B IP network mentioned earlier, our
simulation framework reconstructs topologies of email and
P2P networks at periodic intervals, corresponding to the
respective protocols (SMTP, IMAP, and POP for email;
Gnutella, eDonkey, and BitTorrent for P2P). These time-
stamped service topologies are then input along with the
corresponding infection models to simulate propagation of
the hybrid worm. Table II shows the properties of a typical
trace we used for this set of simulations.
Figure 11 compares the number of infected hosts for the
hybrid (email and P2P) worm with a mass-mailing worm,
for an initial number (N(0)) of infected hosts N(0)= 2 and
10. Initially infected hosts are chosen at random with an
equal probability in the email and P2P topologies. We
perform 1000 repetitionswith each set of simulation param-
eters to calculate the average values of the number of
infections. Figure 11 indicates that a hybrid worm can
spread extremely fast through a network by exploiting both
services. Since the growth rate of spreading is very high,
a fully automated containment system will be necessary to
prevent the spread of such worms---human countermeasures
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Figure 12. Effect of end-host diversity on hybrid worm propaga-
tion (N(0)=10) (v= vulnerability ratio).
will be useless. The results inFigure 11 assume that all email
and P2P hosts are equally vulnerable to the worm attack. In
practice, there is considerable diversity in client versions,
OS, hardware and application software. This diversity will
affect hybrid worms targeting multiple services. To account
for such diversity, we repeat the above simulations with dif-
ferent numbers of initially immune nodes. Figure 12 shows
the number of infected hosts for different fractions of the
vulnerable population (denoted as v). The results indicate a
signiﬁcant reduction in the total number of infected hosts
due to node diversity.
6. RELATED WORK
The most relevant literature are malware simulators such
as Refs. [37--39]. However, these simulators assume a
simpliﬁed model of Internet connectivity and employ a
mathematical model for the worm trafﬁc. They do not con-
sider an integrated multi-service and multi-mode network
that may contain wired, wireless and cellular segments.
As a result, any change in topology due to user mobil-
ity is not reﬂected in the simulations, thus limiting these
simulators to traditionalwormsandviruses.To simulate epi-
demics in very large networks with millions of hosts (i.e.,
Internet-scale epidemics such as Code Red and Melissa),
several researchers have developed distributed worm sim-
ulators. For example, the authors of Ref. [40] presented
PAWS, a distributed simulator running on the Emulab
testbed. The authors derived inter-Autonomous Systems
(AS) bandwidth data from existing literature to simulate
the major Internet AS, and developed congestion mod-
els from worm trafﬁc. They simulated scanning worms
(Code Red v2 and Slammer) and showed excellent agree-
ment with the experimental data from the real world. While
very powerful for studying Internet-scale epidemics, PAWS
may not be suitable for studying the heterogeneous envi-
ronment of an enterprise network as well as topological
worms. A number of simulators have attempted to recre-
ate the AS topology of the Internet. Our approach is to
generate topologies speciﬁc to the service provider’s net-
work from collected traces. For enterprise-level modeling
and vulnerability assessment, trace-based simulations pro-
vide a detailed andmore realisticmethod.Another excellent
distributed simulation framework for the Internet is pre-
sented in Ref. [39]. The authors used GTNetS and PDNS
(a parallel version of NS-2) simulators to generate packet-
level traces of worm trafﬁc. Due to the large computational
overhead, these simulators are typically run on powerful
clusters (often deploying 100 CPUs or more). There are
many epidemiological models of worm spread reported
in the literature. The deterministic models use simpliﬁed
assumptions of homogeneous topologies and aggregated
behavior.We havementioned some of the relevant literature
in Ref. [3].
Recent studies [41,42] have proposed a taxonomy of
botnets along several dimensions such as C&C models,
communication protocols, evasion techniques, and effec-
tiveness of botnet structures. These dimensions can be used
to tailor different response techniques to detect and dis-
rupt botnets. For example, the authors of Ref. [41] observe
that targeted responses are highly effective against scale-
free botnets where as random-graph botnets (e.g. those
using P2P protocols) are highly resistant to both random
and targeted responses. The authors of Ref. [43] present a
stochastic activity networkmodel of P2P botnets and exam-
ine how different factors impact the growth of the network.
Recently, [44] has provided new insight into the economics
of the Storm botnet and its spam generation agents.
7. CONCLUSION
The traditional epidemicmodels ofmalware propagation do
not capture several unique characteristics of today’s mal-
ware and network environments. Interactions among the
users/infected hosts at different spatial and time scales cre-
ate different vulnerable interaction topologies, rather than
an average degree of connectivity among the nodes, as
assumed by many epidemiological models. Mobile users
with laptops, PDAs, and cell phones not only contribute
to these time-varying service topologies, but also intro-
duce new vulnerabilities as well, e.g., Mabir-type viruses
that can spread via SMS/MMS messages and Bluetooth
connections. Further, today’s networks consist of diverse
network segments with different levels of bandwidth, ser-
vices, and latencies. All of these factors affect the growth
rate of an epidemic. Our agent-based modeling framework
captures these factors and uses topologies constructed from
trafﬁc traces collected from service providers’ networks.
Using this framework, an enterprise can perform a realistic
vulnerability assessment of its popular services (e.g. SMS,
Bluetooth, email, P2P, and IM) given all its network seg-
ments. These services are often targeted bymalware writers
and increasingly, new malware are designed to exploit
many of these services simultaneously. Our extensive sim-
ulations show that combining these services increases the
initial growth rate of the epidemic almost exponentially
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and therefore, human countermeasures will be useless. The
simulation study of Cabir also points out the potential vul-
nerability fromunprotectedBluetooth interfaces in amobile
network.
There are several areas of future work. We plan
to model botnets in more detail, especially their coor-
dination mechanisms. There are also other emerging
web-application-based attacks (see Ref. [10]), mobile
attacks targeted to SMS/MMS, and Bluetooth users that
are not yet well-understood. The ﬂexibility of AMM allows
investigationof these emergingmalware by abstracting their
behavior in terms of a small number of parameters while
keeping their propagation and coordination details at a ﬁne-
grained level.
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